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Abstract
We introduce the Input Rank as a measure of relevance of direct and indirect suppliers
in Global Value Chains. We conceive an intermediate input to be more relevant for a
downstream buyer if a decrease in that input’s productivity affects that buyer more.
In particular, in our framework, the relevance of any input depends on: i) the network
position of the supplier relative to the buyer, ii) the patterns of intermediate inputs
vs. labor intensities connecting the buyer and the supplier, iii) and the competitive
pressures along supply chains. After we compute the Input Rank from both U.S. and
world Input-Output tables, we provide useful insights on the crucial role of services
inputs as well as on the relatively higher relevance of domestic suppliers and suppliers
coming from regionally integrated partners. Finally, we test that the Input Rank is a
good predictor of vertical integration choices made by 20,489 U.S. parent companies
controlling 154,836 subsidiaries worldwide.
Keywords: Global Value Chains; Input Output tables; production networks; vertical
integration; multinational enterprises; downstreamness
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1 Introduction
Modern economies organize as webs of specialized producers within and across national bor-
ders. Each company plunges into complex production networks whose configuration is often
recursive because the contribution of some intermediate inputs is needed at different stages
of completion. Take the case of Audi, a German automobile manufacturer with productive
plants around the world. According to the Automotive Industry Portal (2020), it relies
upon the deliveries of 1, 535 direct suppliers located in 45 countries. Among its suppliers,
we find Brembo S.p.A., a well-known producer of brakes in Italy, and Bosch Corporation, a
subsidiary of the Bosch Group producing valves and other components in Japan. Brembo
S.p.A., in turn, reports 33 direct suppliers of parts and components, among which we detect
Garrett Motion, a Swiss producer of stamping and aluminum casting. Yet, Garrett Motion
is also a direct supplier of Audi, and it delivers components to Bosch Corporation in Japan.
After first explorations, we encounter Garrett Motion at least three times in Audi’s global
supply network, once as a direct and twice as an indirect supplier.
Similar interlocking patterns are systematic in the global industry, not only in the au-
tomotive sector. Consequently, a global fragmentation of production entails a combination
of both spider-like and snake-like configurations of supply networks (Baldwin and Venables,
2013), both within and across national borders. Yet, the organization of Global Value Chains
(GVCs) is mainly modeled assuming a technology of productive tasks over linear sequences,
i.e., the ’chain’, oriented on upstream-downstream segments (Costinot et al., 2012; Antra`s
and Chor, 2013; Fally and Hillberry, 2018; Alfaro et al., 2019; Antra`s and de Gortari, 2020).
The linear production sequence envisioned in these models allows tractability and enables
authors to uncover the primitives of an organization based on mutual contractual interdepen-
dence between buyers and suppliers. Final producers meet consumers’ demands and realize
a surplus distributed with direct and indirect suppliers. Therefore, a blend of contractual
environment and market forces shapes the final distribution of the surplus. Inspired by these
theoretical models, scholars proposed GVC position metrics, i.e., the Upstreamness and the
Downstreamness, which capture a notion of distance of suppliers in the Input-Output net-
work (Alfaro et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2017; Antra`s and Chor, 2018; Antra`s and Chor, 2013;
Antras et al., 2012).
In this paper, we introduce the Input Rank as a bilateral measure of the technological
relevance of any, direct or indirect, input in a supply network of a given firm. We start by
modeling the problem of a producer, embedded in a network of buyer-supplier relationships,
who plans the delivery of her output taking into account the complex web of input-output
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relations. In this, we build upon recent contributions on production networks (Carvalho
and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019; Grassi and Sauvagnat, 2019; Baqaee, 2018; Grassi, 2017; Carvalho,
2014). Crucially, in our framework, the most important (direct or indirect) inputs of a firm
are the ones that have the potential to affect the marginal costs of that firm the most.
Notably, apart from a full account of the network structure of the supply side of the
economy, we allow for a rich heterogeneity concerning how much firms rely on intermediate
inputs, as well as competitive forces within each sector. At each stage of production, a lower
intensity in the usage of intermediate inputs (i.e., a higher intensity in labor services) buffers
the transmission of a shock from upstream markets. Thus, an upstream supplier will rank
relatively higher for a given buyer when there are more supply chains (paths) connecting
them, and these supply chains are comprised of firms that rely more on intermediate inputs
in their production process. At the same time, a higher markup (i.e., a lower competitive
pressure) on upstream markets will make downstream buyers more sensitive to input-specific
productivity shocks.
In the second part of our paper, we bring our model to the data. We calibrate it on
the U.S. Input-Output tables, sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2002),
and on the world Input-Output tables, sourced from WIOD (Timmer et al., 2015). We
provide interesting insights into the network dimensions of global production. In particular,
we uncover the crucial role of services inputs, which are most central in the configuration
of production networks. Then, when we look at geography, we show a pecking order in
buyers’ sensitivity to input shocks: first domestic suppliers and then suppliers from region-
ally integrated neighbors (e.g., intra-EU, intra-NAFTA, intra-ASEAN input trade) have the
potential to hit harder on downstream buyers.
Finally, we contrast the Input Rank with the Downstreamness (Antra`s and Chor, 2013),
Upstreamness (Alfaro et al., 2019), and measures based on the Leontief inverse. First of
all, we discuss how neither of them considers the endogenous nature of quantities/values
reported in I-O tables, where technology blends with market forces to shape the transmission
of economic value across industries and countries. Second, we argue that, contrary to the
measures mentioned above, the Input Rank accounts for competition structure within sectors.
We test the correlation of the Input Rank with choices of vertical integration made by
20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 154,836 subsidiaries worldwide. We find that a
higher Input Rank is positively associated with higher odds that a (direct or indirect) input
is vertically integrated. Additionally, we find that parent companies preferably integrate
suppliers that are not too distant on the network because they report a relatively lower
Upstreamness.
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To grasp the general intuition of inputs’ centrality, let us introduce the case of the U.S.
economy, which we can plot as a production network1 in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Input-Output Network from U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables
Note: Nodes represent 425 6-digit NAICS industries from the U.S. BEA 2002 Input-Output tables.
Edges represent 51,768 industry-pair transactions. Network density: 0.286. Average path length: 1.7
links. The graph is visualized using a Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout with the GEPHI software.
More connected industries (weighted out-degree) at the center stage. Selected industries in evidence.
According to the BEA (2002) Input-Output tables, we can represent it as a collection
of 425 industries (i.e., nodes) linked by 51,768 transactions (i.e., edges). In Figure 1, we
organize U.S. industries on a two-dimension space according to their reciprocal connectivity,
following a Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout, which in our case posits more requested
inputs at the center stage. Interestingly, services industries make the core of the U.S. pro-
duction network because they are used as direct inputs in many other (manufacturing and
services) industries. On the other hand, primary industries like agriculture and forestry are
1A bird’s eye view of the U.S. production network represented in Figure 1 returns an idea of a ’global’
outdegree centrality of each industry within a production network. Later, we introduce the Input Rank as
a centrality measure of a Katz-Bonacich type (see Bloch et al. (2019) for a review of centrality measures in
networks). In the U.S. I-O tables, we find a network density of 0.286, i.e., the fraction of actual linkages
out of all potential linkages is relatively high. The average path length connecting any two industries is just
1.7 links, pointing to the U.S. economy’s small-world nature. Briefly, on average, any producer in an output
industry sources inputs from most of the other industries, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, the network
of Figure 1 is not separable: it is self-contained in a unique connected component where it is always possible
to run seamlessly from one node to another by following input linkages.
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rather peripheral and mostly located in the north-west area of the graph because their in-
puts are not as widely used as other inputs. Among services, let us pick the case of R&D
(code 541700) and Wholesale Trade (code 541800), which are among the most connected
industries. In fact, wholesalers have a prominent role in professionally distributing many
intermediate inputs in different moments of the production process, whereas R&D services
are pivotal in fostering innovation across most U.S. sectors. Now, let us contrast them with
two consumer goods industries: Electronic Computer Manufacturing (code 334111) and Au-
tomobile Manufacturing (code 336111). They appear to be at the periphery of the U.S.
production network because they mostly meet final consumers.
However, once we compare the network positions of selected industries in Figure 1 with
their positions on the Downstreamness segment (Antra`s and Chor, 2013) in Figure 2, we
curiously find that both R&D and Wholesale Trade are in the middle of an ideally linear
supply chain. This is in contrast with the stylized value chain we may have in mind, where
a representative business line starts with R&D services and ends with distribution services2.
Figure 2: Downstreamness from the U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables
Downstreamness (DuseTuse) is sourced from Antra`s and Chor (2013). Frequency indicates how many
industries out of a total of 425 from U.S. Input-Output tables in that specific position. Selected industries:
Scientific Research and Development Services (code 541700, value 0.504); Wholesale Trade (code 541800,
value 0.666); Electronic Computer Manufacturing (code 334111, value 0.959); Automobile Manufacturing
(code 336111, value 0.999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section 2 discusses re-
lated literature. Section 3 introduces a compact theory for the Input Rank. In Section 4,
2Alfaro et al. (2019) compute a more recent bilateral position metrics, the Upstreamness, which considers
the heterogeneity of input positions oriented towards different outputs. However, R&D services are still on
average located in the middle of the output-specific technological sequences, i.e., the average Upstreamness
value is 3.044 for an indicator that ranges approximately from 1 to 8.9.
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we compute the Input Rank on both the U.S. and world Input-Output tables to describe
preliminary evidence. In Section 5, we test the role of the Input Rank in firm-level choices
of vertical integration. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
2 Related literature
A fruitful strand of research emerged in the last decade to study how network dimensions
are essential in the organization of production, and how much they contribute to explaining
aggregate fluctuations as a response to microeconomic shocks (Grassi and Sauvagnat, 2019;
Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019; Baqaee, 2018; Baqaee and Farhi, 2018; Oberfield, 2018;
Acemoglu et al., 2012; Carvalho, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012). International economics
potentially offers a unique environment to study the network dimensions of cross-country
trade, investment, and mobility of workers (Chaney, 2016, 2014). Yet, the literature on
trade and production networks is still in its infancy, and many questions remain unanswered
(Bernard and Moxnes, 2018).
In this contribution, we focus on bridging with the theory and empirics of Global Value
Chains (GVCs), as the latter have been mainly modeled and tested as supposedly linear
technological sequences (Alfaro et al., 2019; Fally and Hillberry, 2018; Rungi and Del Prete,
2018; Del Prete and Rungi, 2017; Antra`s and Chor, 2018; Wang et al., 2017; Miller and
Temurshoev, 2017; Antra`s and Chor, 2013; Antras et al., 2012), although the existence of
spider-like vs. snake-like configurations had been acknowledged by Baldwin and Venables
(2013). The primary purpose of previous literature is to explain how contractual inter-
dependence can shape the organization of GVCs in terms of vertical integration vis a´ vis
outsourcing strategies. Berlingieri et al. (2018) recently highlights how the technological
importance of inputs on GVCs can be shaped by a solution to both ex post contracting
problems (transaction costs) and ex ante lack of incentives and underinvestment problems
(property rights forces). An implicit step in modeling a network dimension in GVCs has
been made by Antra`s and de Gortari (2020), who assume that a linear technology interacts
with the geographic centrality of alternative locations. de Gortari (2019) and Caliendo and
Parro (2014) also exploit implicit information on the network configurations of GVCs to
build numerical trade policy counterfactuals based on the transmission of value from inputs
to outputs across national borders.
In our contribution, we introduce the Input Rank as the calibration of a simple net-
work model of production that allows catching the economic interdependence of producers
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plugged in a complex supply structure, allowing loops and multiple paths between suppli-
ers and customers. We start from a basic setup whose scope is to study the transmission
of microeconomic shocks (Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019; Grassi and Sauvagnat, 2019;
Baqaee, 2018; Grassi, 2017). Our intuition is that we can frame a problem of input sourc-
ing from a similar perspective. First, a downstream producer observes the topology of her
supply structure made of direct and indirect inputs; then, she can assess the impact of a
productivity shock of any intermediate input, based on how the shock propagates through
the network.
Input Rank is a recursive measure, and as such is similar to classic eigenvector-type
centrality measures like the PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998), first used in social networks
and search engines, and the Katz (1953) centrality, first used to assess social status (see
Bloch et al. (2019) for an extensive discussion and axiomatization of centrality measures
used in network analysis). Different variants of eigenvector centrality have been applied
to many different domains, from biology and genetics to financial debts, bibliometrics, and
road engineering (Gleich, 2015; Newman, 2018). In either case, a node is more critical in
a network if other well-connected nodes point to it, but more distant nodes become less
crucial depending on a dampening factor. Similarly, in our production framework, a (direct
or indirect) input is more relevant if it delivers (receives) to (from) other highly requested
inputs. However, distant suppliers become less and less crucial when labor services are
used more intensively along the network, because the downstream buyer relies less on the
deliveries by (direct and indirect) suppliers.
3 A simple model for ranking inputs
In this section, we lay out the theoretical foundations for ranking inputs in supply networks.
Assessing the importance of a supplier is not a straightforward task when production pro-
cesses are fragmented. To illustrate this point, we start with a stylized example depicted in
Figure 3, where nodes indicate sectors or representative firms from those sectors (hereafter
simply referred to as firms or nodes), whereas directed links indicate deliveries of goods or
services.
We focus on the supply chain of firm 1. Consider a scenario in which firm 4 is affected by
a distortion or a shock due to which it produces an output of a lower quality/productivity for
its customers (firm 3). This affects firm 3’s production process since firm 3 uses the output
of firm 4 directly in production, and moreover the aforementioned shock is (partially) passed
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down from firm 3 directly to firm 2, and both directly and indirectly (through firm 2) to firm
1. Thus, the shock hitting firm 4 is transmitted downstream along the network of producers,
reaching and affecting firm 1 through different routes. Intuitively, we expect the indirect
effect of the shock hitting firm 4 on firm 1 to depend on how much firm 1 relies, directly
and indirectly, on the output produced by firm 4. This, in turn, will depend on the relative
position of firms 4 and 1 in the network of producers, in particular on the number of weighted
paths of any length stemming from 4 and reaching firm 1, but also, as will be apparent from
the model, the competition structure in sectors along the supply chains.
Figure 3: A fictional supply network
In this section, we present a simple general equilibrium model which formalizes the in-
tuition from our simple example. For any given firm operating in sector k in the economy,
the model provides a measure of importance of a firm from sector h as a supplier (direct and
indirect) of that firm, taking fully into account the network structure of the production side
of the economy. We call this measure the Input Rank of h relative to k. Our theoretical
framework is, in many respects, standard in the literature of production networks, and thus
we present it in a quite compact manner. In particular we build directly on Grassi (2017)
and Baqaee (2018). Formal proofs of the claims are relegated to the Appendix.
3.1 Consumers
There are two types of agents in the economy: firms and the representative consumer. We
denote the set of firms in the economy with N . Firms are grouped in M sectors. Each
firm belongs to exactly one sector, and it produces a single differentiated variety of a sector-
specific good.
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The representative consumer owns all firms in the economy and supplies one unit of labor
inelastically. The preferences of the consumer over M goods are defined with the following
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(c1, c2, ..., cM) = C = θ
M∏
k=1
cγkk (1)
where ck is the consumption of good k,
∑
k γk = 1, and θ =
∏M
k=1 γ
−γk
k is a normalization
constant to simplify computations. The composite consumption good k is defined with:
ck =
(
Mk∑
i=1
c(k, i)
k−1
k
) k
k−1
, (2)
where c(k, i) denotes the consumption of variety i of good k, k > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution across varieties of good k, and Mk denotes the number of firms (varieties) in
sector k. The consumer maximizes her utility subject to the following budget constraint:
M∑
k=1
Mk∑
i=1
p(k, i)c(k, i) = w +
M∑
k=1
Mk∑
i=1
pi(k, i), (3)
where p(k, i) is the price of variety i in sector k, pi(k, i) is the profit of firm i ∈ k, and w is
the worker’s wage bill.
3.2 Firms
Firms in sector k are symmetric and use the same constant returns to scale technology
that combines labor ` and intermediate inputs.3 Each firm in k produces an imperfectly
substitutable variety i of good k. Let us denote with y(k, i) the output of firm i from sector
k, with `(k, i) its labor input, and with x(k, i, h, j) the amount of variety j of good h used in
the production of variety i of good k. Thus, the profit of firm i in sector k is defined with:
pi(k, i) = p(k, i)y(k, i)−
M∑
h=1
Mh∑
j=1
p(h, j)x(k, i, h, j)− w`(k, i) (4)
The production possibilities of a typical firm i from sector k are defined with the following
3For simplicity labor is the only internal factor of production in the model, i.e., it is not delivered by
other firms. Clearly, the model can be extended to include more production factors in a symmetric way
without affecting the results.
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nested production function:
y(k, i) = ζk`(k, i)
βk
 M∏
h=1
[
Mh∑
j=1
[
τ−1h x(k, i, h, j)
] εh−1
εh
] εh
εh−1
ghk
αk . (5)
where, because of the constant returns to scale assumption, αk + βk = 1 and
∑
h ghk = 1.
We normalize ζk = β
−βk
k
∏N
h=1 g
−αkghk
hk to simplify the computations.
Matrix G = (ghk)
M
h,k=1 defines the sector level (technological) production network of the
economy, in which the set of nodes is the set of sectors in the economy {1, 2, ...,M}, and
two sectors h and k are connected with directed link h → k if firms in k use good h as
an input in production. Entry ghk of the adjacency matrix G represents the weight of link
h → k, where ghk = 0 indicates that firms from sector k do not use input h as a (direct)
input in production. Given our functional assumptions, ghk ≥ 0 corresponds to the cost
share associated to intermediate inputs from sector h. Therefore, we can directly construct
matrix G using the data from the Input-Output tables. We discuss this in more detail in
Section 4.
Parameter τh ≥ 1 in (5) captures, in a parsimonious way, the productivity of each variety
of good h when used as an intermediate input. Higher values of τh imply a lower productivity
of intermediate input h when used in production. In this paper we are interested in the
effects of marginal changes in τh on the equilibrium outcomes. We sometimes refer to these
changes as shocks, while we refer to τh as a productivity distortion associated to (inputs
produced in) sector h.4 Intuitively, we think of distortion τh as a failure of firms from sector
h to deliver compatible and productive input to their customers on time. Anticipating our
later discussion of the vertical integration, we assume that a firm that uses input h either
directly or indirectly in its production process can, at least partially, mitigate this distortion
by integrating a producer of good h. This is one of the reasons we are interested in this
particular type of distortions.
It is useful to define the composite intermediate input h used in production of variety
i ∈ k (denoted with x(k, i, h)) as an aggregate of varieties of input h:
x(k, i, h) =
[
Mh∑
j=1
[x(k, i, h, j)]
εh−1
εh
] εh
εh−1
, (6)
4For simplicity we assume that distortions and shocks are sector specific. One could of course consider
firm-specific distortions τ(h, j) for j ∈ h, or even pair-specific distortions τ(h, j, k). We abstract from this
type of heterogeneity in the paper.
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in which case we can write (5) as:
y(k, i) = ζk`(k, i)
βk
(
M∏
h=1
(τ−1h x(k, i, h))
ghk
)αk
. (5A)
3.3 Equilibrium
We assume that firms in the same sector operate in a monopolistic competition environment,
and thus set their price to a constant markup over marginal costs. Following Atkeson and
Burstein (2008), we assume that firms set their prices taking as given the other sectors’
prices and quantities, the wage, and the aggregate prices and quantities. In Definition 3.1
we define the equilibrium concept we are considering.
Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium). A market equilibrium is a collection of prices p(k, i), wage
w, input demands x(k, i, h, j), outputs y(k, i), consumption c(k, i) and labor demands `(k, i)
such that:
(i) Each firm i minimizes production costs and applies its mark-up µi to set its price.
(ii) The representative consumer chooses consumption to maximize utility.
(iii) Markets for each good and labor clear.
The existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from standard arguments,
see for instance (Grassi, 2017; Baqaee, 2018).
3.4 Ranking inputs
Informally, we say that (direct or indirect) input h is more important than input r for firm
i ∈ k, or that i ∈ k relies more on h compared to r if a change τh affects firm i ∈ k more
than the same change in τr affects firm i ∈ k. The first question we ask is if and how
the importance of good h for firms in k depends on the underlying structure of sector-level
production network. Proposition 1 provides an answer.
Proposition 1. Let λ(k, i) denote the marginal cost of production of firm i in sector k. The
following holds in the equilibrium:
∂log λ(k, i)
∂log τh
= e′k [I−AG′]−1 eh = e′h [I−GA]−1 ek (7)
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where ek is the k-th unit vector, and A is the diagonal matrix that collects information
about sector specific intermediate inputs’ cost shares, {αk}Mk=1.
In our simple framework, a negative shock (distortion) implies an increase in parameter,
τh. Since the shock cascades through all production paths running towards the downstream
buyers, its impact is a function of both the structure of the production network (captured
by G), and of the intensities in intermediate inputs, {αk}Mk=1. Motivated by Proposition 1
we introduce the Input Rank as a measure of the importance of inputs.
Definition 3.2 (Input Rank). The Input Rank of any upstream supplier of input h relative
to the downstream producer of an output k is:
υhk(GA) = e
′
h [I−GA]−1 ek (8)
In other words, the bilateral Input Rank, υhk, is the (h, k)-th element of the matrix
[I−GA]−1. From the perspective of a producer, vector υk = {υhk}Mh=1 encodes information
on the technological relevance of any direct or indirect input h based on its position in the
supply structure of producer in the sector k. Note that the inverse in (8) exists since G is a
column-stochastic matrix with spectral radius equal to 1, and αk ≤ 1 for each industry k.
In Section 5, we empirically investigate determinants of a firm’s decision to vertically
integrate suppliers. Assuming that the integration of an input allows a firm to mitigate5,
at least partly, distortion τh associated to good h, we expect that a cost-minimizing firm
i ∈ k is more likely to integrate those inputs h for which a decrease in distortion τh will have
the largest positive effect on that firm’s marginal cost of production λ(k, i). The following
proposition is useful as it rationalizes empirical results presented in Table 10.
Proposition 2. The marginal effect of a change in τh on the marginal cost of firm i ∈ k is
higher for higher values of Input Rank υhk, and for lower values of elasticity of substitution
h.
A higher Input Rank, υhk, implies that suppliers from sector h are relatively more impor-
tant for firms operating in sector h (in a sense of Proposition 1), and thus it is not surprising
that the effect of a decrease of distortion τh associated to an upstream sector will have a
5Please note that our purpose is not to characterize a full incentive structure for the relations between
buyers and suppliers. Our model is agnostic with respect to the impact of property rights forces, which have
the potential to reduce investment by vertically integrated suppliers, hence reduce productivity.
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larger effect on the costs of firm i ∈ k the higher the input rank of that sector relative to
k. Moreover, the lower degree of substitutability among varieties in sector h amplifies the
effect of an input productivity distortion.
In an Appendix Section B, we further introduce a variant of the Input Rank where the
downstream buyer imperfectly observes her supply network. We show that, in such a case,
there is a potential downplay of more distant nodes, and the downstream buyer overestimates
the role of more proximate industries. We believe that cases of imperfect information of the
supply network can arise when the contractual environment is imperfect and/or transactions
are relation specific, for example in the sense introduced by Rauch (1999), Nunn (2007),
Nunn and Trefler (2013), and Nunn and Trefler (2014).
4 Calculating Input Rank from Input-Output tables
In this Section, we describe how Input Rank can be calculated using the Input-Output (I-O)
tables. We contrast the Input Rank with well-known metrics of sequential production, i.e.,
the Downstreamness and the Upstreamness. Finally, we provide some insights on inputs’
centrality in the organization of global production. For consistency with previous studies,
we compute the Input Rank on both the U.S. and world Input-Output tables.
To calculate Input Rank using I-O, we first derive the demand of intermediate inputs at
the sector level. Aggregating individual demands x(h, i, k) from Eq. (6), we show that (see
Lemma 3 in Appendix A)
x(k, h) =
αkghkpkyk
µkph
=
k − 1
k
αkghkpkyk
ph
.
Let us define Zhk ≡ phx(k, h), which is the value of input deliveries from sector h to sector
k and is readily available in the I-O data. From (A4) it directly follows that
phx(k, h)∑
` p`x(k, `)
=
Zhk∑
` Z`k
= ghk, (9)
which describes a way to construct G from I-O data. Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas as-
sumption, elements {αk}Mk=1 of the diagonal matrix A can be calculated as cost shares of
intermediate inputs at the sector level. To be more precise, we calculate αk in the following
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way:
αk =
Cost of intermediate inputs of sector k
Total cost on all inputs of sector k
.
The Input Ranks are then calculated by inverting matrix I−GA.
4.1 Relation with other I-O based measures
The Input-Rank, as defined in (8), bears some similarity to other commonly used measures
based on I-O network including the Upstreamness, the Downstreamness and the total input
requirements. In this section we compare the Input Rank to these measures, and argue that
it captures additional information ignored by these measures (i.e. within-sector competition
structure).
Before doing so, let us introduce some additional notation. Let Yk ≡ pkyk denote the value
of gross output of sector k, and let dhk denote the direct requirement coefficient obtained from
I-O tables and equal to the ratio of value of sales from sector h to sector k (Zhk), and the value
of the gross output of sector k (Yk). The matrix (I−D)−1 is known as the Leontief inverse or
the total requirements matrix, where D is the matrix of direct requirements. Antra`s and Chor
(2018) discusses a number of network statistics based on the Leontief inverse and its square
(I−D)−2, including the Downstreamness and the Upstreamness measures, introduced in
Antras et al. (2012); Antra`s and Chor (2013); Miller and Temurshoev (2017).
There are at least two important differences between the Input Rank and these measures.
First, even though the Input Rank matrix (I−GA)−1 is reminiscent of the Leontief inverse
(I−D)−1, matrices GA and D are in general different. To see this, note that from (A4) it
directly follows that:
dhk =
Zhk
Yk
=
phx(k, h)
pkyk
=
k − 1
k
αkghk, (10)
and hence GA = DM, where M is a diagonal matrix of markups, µk =
k
k−1 . Thus, contrary
to the Leontief inverse, the Input Rank explicitly, through markups, takes into account the
within-sector market structure. The two measures coincide only in the special case when
there is a perfect competition in each sector.6 Since elements of the diagonal matrix M are
6Although we assume monopolistic competition within each sector, our model can be easily extended
to different types of within-sector imperfect competition, in which case the exact expression for markups
changes. See Baqaee (2018) for more details.
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greater than one, the Input Rank implies more interdependence between sectors than the
Leontief inverse. Second, the Leontief inverse as well as the above mentioned measures of
Downstreamness and Upstreamness are derived from accounting identities implied by the
I-O tables. The Input Rank measure is a direct result of a (standard) general equilibrium
model that explicitly takes into account the network nature of the production side of the
economy.
To illustrate the empirical difference between the Input Rank and the related measures
discussed above, we report rank correlations in Table 1. Usefully, both the Spearman’s and
the Kendall (1948)’s correlations assess how well the relationship among I-O metrics can be
described by a monotonic function, i.e., when inputs have a similar ordinal position across
metrics. Interestingly, we observe that there is a low and weakly significant rank correla-
tion between the Input Rank and the Upstreamness, albeit with a negative sign given the
upstream orientation of the latter (-.40 and -.27, respectively). In fact, the rank correla-
tions of Input Rank with Upstreamness are lower than the ones with the direct coefficients,
at the bottom of the table (.55 and .30, respectively). In this respect, the Upstreamness
has a relatively higher association with original information from I-O tables (-.68 and -.39,
respectively) than with the Input Rank.
Table 1: Rank correlations
Input Rank (υhk) Upstreamness (upstrhk)
Upstreamness (upstrhk)
Spearman’s ρ -.3962*
Kendall’s τ -.2672*
I-O coefficient (dhk)
Spearman’s ρ .5468* -.6789*
Kendall’s τ .3040* -.3875*
Note: Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlations are computed between the Input Rank, the Upstream-
ness following Alfaro et al. (2019), and the direct requirement coefficients, as originally sourced from
U.S. 2002 I-O tables. All measures are bilateral for 88, 595 input-output pairs. * stands for p-value < .1.
Eventually, given also evidence reported in Table 1, we conclude that the Input Rank,
the Upstreamness, and the direct requirement coefficients from I-O tables convey different
information on I-O linkages.
14
4.2 U.S. Input Output tables
U.S. I-O 2002 tables, compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), sketch a rea-
sonably fine-grained supply network established among 6-digit industries. The same ta-
bles have been extensively used to study production networks (Carvalho, 2014), vertical
integration choices (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Alfaro et al., 2016), and to compute Upstream-
ness/Downstreamness metrics (Alfaro et al., 2019; Antra`s and Chor, 2013). In Figure 1, we
already showed how a solid and complex production network emerges from a visualization of
U.S. I-O tables. After a closer look, we register a strong heterogeneity in sourcing strategies
at the industry level. For example, in Appendix Figures C1 and C2, we report both the in-
degree and out-degree distributions by industry, i.e., the number of inputs received and the
deliveries made by each node of the U.S. production network. On average, the in-degree of
an industry is higher than its out-degree. As expected, the industry with the highest number
of input industries (296) is the Retail Trade (code 4A0000), because retailers professionally
sell physical goods to consumers. On the other hand, the industry with the highest number
of purchasing industries (425) is the Wholesale Trade (code 420000), because wholesalers
professionally distribute intermediate physical inputs to all industries. Yet, ‘global’ centrali-
ties measured by in- or out-degrees are of scarce interest to understand the ‘local’ role of an
upstream industry with respect to each downstream output.
More properly, the Input Rank shall return the technological relevance of an input market
for a downstream producer active in an output market. In Figure 4, we visualize the results
from the computation of the Input Rank as a matrix of industry-pair values. A darker cell
implies that an input industry is more technologically relevant for the producers in a specific
output industry. Interestingly, from the upper part of the matrix, we find that services
industries are the most relevant across many manufacturing and services industries. Please
note that the diagonal is always dark, since most producers source an important amount of
inputs within their industry, hence intra-industry suppliers are also technologically relevant.
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Figure 4: Input Rank computed on U.S. 2002 Input-Output tables
Note: Input Rank vectors are computed for each using industry among 421 industries classified at the
6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables. A darker cell implies that an input is more technologically relevant
for an output.
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Table 2: Top 20 inputs
Abs. Rank I-O code Industry name avg. Input Rank st. dev.
1 531000 Real Estate .03442 .03390
2 550000 Management of Companies and Enterprises .02369 .02977
3 420000 Wholesale Trade .02067 .02903
4 211000 Oil and Gas Extraction .01799 .01378
5 324110 Petroleum Refineries .01425 .01342
6 221100 Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution .01416 .02026
7 533000 Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets .01383 .00770
8 517000 Telecommunications .01350 .02307
9 52A000 Monetary Authorities and Depository Credit Intermediation .01263 .02721
10 541800 Advertising and Related Services .01254 .02084
11 331110 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing .01216 .02891
12 484000 Truck Transportation .01017 .01935
13 325190 Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing .00922 .01273
14 523000 Securities, Commodity Contracts, Investments, and Related Activities .00870 .02910
15 221200 Natural Gas Distribution .00783 .00779
16 325211 Plastic Material and Resin Manufacturing .00736 .01384
17 522A00 Nondepository Credit Intermediation and Related Activities .00729 .02284
18 722000 Food Services and Drinking Places .00707 .02276
19 230301 Nonresidential Maintenance and Repair .00682 .02646
20 541610 Management, Scientific, and Technical Consulting Services .00645 .02803
Note: Average values computed for usage across using industries. Input Rank vectors are computed for
each using industry among 421 industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables.
Table 3: Top 20 manufacturing inputs
Abs. Rank I-O code Industry name avg. Input Rank st. dev.
5 324110 Petroleum Refineries .01425 .01342
11 331110 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing .01216 .02084
13 325190 Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing .00922 .01273
16 325211 Plastic Material and Resin Manufacturing .00736 .01384
21 336300 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing .00645 .01634
26 334413 Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing .00560 .01530
27 334418 Printed Circuit Assembly Manufacturing .00525 .01347
28 325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing .00502 .00708
29 32619A Other Plastics Product Manufacturing .00497 .01531
33 322210 Paperboard Container Manufacturing .00466 .01181
38 321100 Sawmills and Wood Preservation .00448 .01495
41 323110 Printing .00410 .01906
43 322120 Paper Mills .00403 .01360
48 3259A0 All Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing .00365 .01077
50 326110 Plastics Packaging Materials and Unlaminated Film and Sheet Manufacturing .00349 01280
52 332710 Machine Shops .00345 .02262
54 33131A Alumina Refining and Primary Aluminium Production .00331 .014346
55 322130 Paperboard Mills .00315 .01106
63 332800 Coating, Engraving, Heat Treating and Allied Activities .00290 .01739
64 331411 Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper .00283 .01312
Note: Average values computed for usage across using industries. Input Rank vectors are computed for
each using industry among 421 industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables. Absolute
rank indicates the position when considering also services inputs.
17
In Table 2, we report the average Input Rank for top 20 inputs across all I-O industries
with standard deviations. Here, as well, we find that services industries are, on average,
ranked higher than manufacturing. The top three inputs are Real Estate (code 531000),
Management of Companies and Enterprises7 (code 550000), and Wholesale Trade (code
420000).
Further down, we find energy including fossil fuels (codes 211000, 324110, and 221200)
and electricity (code 221100). Royalties (code 533000), telecommunications (code 517000),
the financial sector (codes 52A000, 523000, and 522A00), and R&D services (code 541610)
are also relatively more important than many manufacturing industries. In fact, when we
look at top manufacturing inputs in Table 3, we have to go deep further down the rank with
lower magnitudes and rising standard deviations. The ratio between the Input Ranks of top
first and top 20th input in both Tables 2 and 3 is above 5, indicating that there is a relatively
high skewness of the Input Rank distributions.
Clearly, values of the Input Rank can be much heterogeneous across downstream pro-
ducers. In Appendix Tables C1 and C2, we look from the perspective of selected root indus-
tries (Electronic Computer Manufacturing, code 334111; Automobile Manufacturing, code
336111), and we find that top ten inputs by technological centrality always include a combi-
nation of manufacturing inputs that are predictably specific for their production processes,
and a selection of services that rank higher despite their lower I-O technical requirements
4.3 International Input-Output tables
In this Section, we report computations of the Input Rank on world Input-Output Tables
by WIOD. World I-O tables have been extensively used in settings where the geographical
dimension of GVCs is important (among others, see World Bank (2020); Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2016); Adao et al. (2017); Caliendo and Parro (2014); Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare (2014), where the main issue has been to track value added generation by country and
industry while avoiding a classical problem of multiple accounting from standard interna-
tional trade data. For a useful review, see Johnson (2018).
WIOD data report information on exchanges among 43 countries and 56 ISIC rev. 4
2-digit industries in the period 2000 - 2014. A model for the rest of the world balances world
7This sector mainly gathers headquarters services by holding firms. As from the original definition (BLS,
2018): ’This sector comprises: i) companies that hold financial activities (securities or other equity interests)
in other companies for the purpose of a corporate control to influence management decisions; ii) companies
that professionally administer, oversee, and manage other companies through strategic or organizational
planning and decision making.’
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trade. Additional socio-economic accounts contain the information we need to calculate
labor and intermediate shares. For further details, see (Timmer et al., 2015).
After computing the Input Rank on WIOD in year 2014, we report averages and stan-
dard deviations for top 10 supplying countries in Table 4. On the podium, we find China,
Germany, and the USA. Notably, Russia is fourth thanks to the shipment of primary inputs
and fuels, which are technologically relevant inputs across many countries and industries.
Italy ranks also high thanks to its centrality within many manufacturing supply chains, as
producers both import and export intermediate inputs with many partners.
When we report averages and standard deviations for top input industries in Table 5,
we find on the podium: i) Mining and Quarrying (code B); ii) Wholesale Trade (code G46);
iii) Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply (code (D35). Similarly to what
observed in the case of U.S. I-O tables, we find that manufacturing inputs have a relatively
lower technological relevance than services and primary industries.
Table 4: Top 10 supplying countries by Input Rank in the World I-O tables (WIOD).
Abs. Rank Origin country Avg. Input Rank st. dev.
1 China .00352 .02773
2 Germany .00310 .02409
3 USA .00275 .02403
4 Russia .00218 .02389
5 Italy .00206 .02403
6 UK .00178 .02395
7 France .00168 .02390
8 S. Korea .00150 .02489
9 Poland .00146 .02386
10 Turkey .00140 .02545
Note: The full Input Rank matrix on WIOD data has been computed starting from 43 countries per 56
industries possible origins of sourcing. Average values and standard deviations reported for every triplet
including: destination country, destination industry, sourcing industry.
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Table 5: Top 10 input industries by Input Rank in the World I-O tables (WIOD).
Abs. Rank I-O code Origin industry Avg. Input Rank st. dev.
1 B Mining and Quarrying .00343 .02810
2 G46 Wholesale Trade .00331 .02545
3 D35 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply .00309 .03349
4 C20 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products .00286 .02558
5 N Administrative and Support Service Activities .00285 .02620
6 K64 Financial Service Activities .00275 .02760
7 C19 Manufacture of Coke and Refined Petroleum Products .00252 .02403
8 M69&M70 Legal and Accounting Activities; Head Offices; Management Consultancy .00249 .02508
9 C24 Manufacture of Basic Metals .00242 .02598
10 H49 Land Transport and Transport via Pipelines .00227 .02501
Note: The full Input Rank matrix on WIOD data has been computed starting from 43 countries per 56
industries possible origins of sourcing. Average values and standard deviations reported for every triplet
including: destination country, destination industry, sourcing country.
However, please note that ISIC 2-digit industries in WIOD aggregate much more than
NAICS 6-digit industries in U.S. I-O tables, thus confounding several intermediate inputs, on
one hand, and intermediate inputs with final goods in the same category, on the other hand.
For this reason, we prefer keeping U.S. tables for following exercises on vertical integration
(Section 5), where our interest properly falls on the technological relevance of an upstream
industry wherever the origin country for sourcing.
Nonetheless, we can still comment on applications to the WIOD data to describe the
relevance of trading partners in general, with a geographic disaggregation, as providers of
inputs to producers in other countries. For this reason, in Table 6, we look at the sourcing
strategies of three countries, USA, China, and Germany, which were also classified as most
relevant suppliers in Table 4. Brefly, this time we are interested in ranking their providers
of inputs.
Interestingly, on top of the rank, in each case, we find the country itself. Domestic
producers are by far the most relevant, according to our Input Rank, as a domestic shock
have the the potential to hit relatively more than foreign shocks. In second places, China is a
crucial partner for both USA and Germany, whereas South Korea is the most central foreign
partner for China. Further down in the rankings, we notice a predominance of regional
trading partners, possibly located in the same region/continent.
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Table 6: Top 10 origin countries by Input Rank for USA, China, and Germany
USA China Germany
Abs. Rank Origin country Avg. Input Rank st. dev Origin country Avg. Input Rank st. dev Origin country Avg. Input Rank st. dev
1 USA .04166 .14990 China .05793 .17196 Germany .03822 .15154
2 China .00167 .00327 S. Korea .00068 .00211 China .00185 .00344
3 Canada .00123 .00419 USA .00062 .00096 Netherlands .00162 .00507
4 Mexico .00073 .00191 Japan .00053 .00130 USA .00149 .00237
5 Germany .00048 .00089 Australia .00051 .00166 Russia .00101 .00319
6 Japan .00046 .00127 Taiwan .00040 .00203 France .0010 .00203
7 Korea .00037 .00090 Russia .00039 .00105 Italy .00094 .00200
8 UK .00034 .00049 Germany .00037 .00064 UK .00081 .00137
9 Russia .00026 .00067 Brazil .00026 .00063 Poland .00066 .00180
10 France .00022 .00041 Indonesia .00015 .00041 Belgium .00065 .00180
Note: Input Rank vectors for USA, China and Germany have been computed starting from 43 countries per 56 industries possible origins of
sourcing. Average values and standard deviations reported for within-country industry-level Input Ranks.
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4.4 A pecking order in the geography of sourcing
To check whether the country studies showed in Table 6 present regularities that can be
extended to other countries, we test dummy regressions in Table 7 and repeat the exercise
first for all industries and then for manufacturing industries only.
We consider the (log of the) Input Rank as dependent variables and two binary variables
as regressors. The idea is to catch the premia in technological centrality by the geography of
sourcing. The first indicator is equal to one if the (direct or indirect) supplier are Domestic,
and zero otherwise. A second binary indicator is equal to one if the (direct or indirect)
suppliers come from the same region/continent of the final buyers, i.e., they are Intraregion.
Two-way fixed effects for supplying and buying industries are included. Standard errors are
clustered multiway following Cameron et al. (2011) and including the quartet of countries
and industries in origin and destination. The exercise is repeated for EU members, former
NAFTA members, and for Asian countries8
Interestingly, the results clearly indicate a pecking order in the geography of upstream
markets. Domestic producers rank relatively higher than intra-regional ones, which in turn
rank higher than all other suppliers. In fact, we find that domestic (direct or indirect) sup-
pliers are on average 5 times, 3.2 times, and 4.7 times more central for a representative buyer
in the European Union, the former NAFTA9, and Asian countries, respectively. Despite high
trade openness, domestic producers are still by far the most technologically relevant for most
producers.
On the other hand, if any shock occurs on foreign upstream markets, our results show that
final producers will be hit harder if they operate under the same regional trade agreements.
The premium on centrality is, on average, 1.6 and 2 times more in the case of intra-EU
and intra-NAFTA shipments. It is relatively less (0.85%) but still positive and statistically
significant in the case of Asian producers.
8Please note that we included Australia in the group of Asian countries present in WIOD data (China,
Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) because the country is among the biggest trading partners
of all of them. Moreover, all these countries, including Australia, participate in the ASEAN Plus Six, an
enlarged version of the Association of the South-East Asian Nations, which promotes regional economic
integration.
9The North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been substituted by the United
States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). After renegotiations in the period 2017/2018, the USMCA
entered into force in all member states on July 1, 2020.
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Table 7: Input Rank: a pecking order on geography
Dependent variable EU EU NAFTA NAFTA ASEAN ASEAN
(log of) Input Rank
Domestic 5.053*** 4.299*** 3.196*** 2.078* 4.722*** 4.042***
(.281) (.302) (.703) (.569) (.383) (.430)
Intraregion 1.596*** 1.642*** 1.984*** 2.488*** .849*** .739**
(.193) (.171) (.151) (.075) (.252) (.221)
Constant -13.226*** -12.758*** -11.251*** -10.630*** -11.550*** -10.585***
(.373) (.402) (1.105) (.806) (.373) (.478)
N. obs. 3,486,124 394,856 360,797 42,390 965,888 98,910
Activities All Manuf Only All Manuf Only All Manuf Only
N. origin countries 43+1 43+1 43+1 43+1 43+1 43+1
N. destination countries 28 28 3 3 7 7
Origin industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multiway clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R squared .366 .244 .344 .363 .489 .393
Note: Cross-section data for year 2014 are sourced from WIOD data (Timmer et al., 2015), including 43
countries, 56 industries, and a closure for the ’rest of the world’. Fixed effects by supplying and buying
industries. Errors are clustered multiway following Cameron et al. (2011), considering origin country,
supplying industry, destination country, and buying industry. ***, **, * stand for p < .01 and p < .05,
and p < .1, respectively.
When we restrict our analysis to manufacturing industries only, in columns 2, 4, and
6 of Table 7, we find that there is a lower albeit still high centrality of domestic suppliers
in all cases. Yet, in the case of former NAFTA, intraregional manufacturing suppliers are,
on average, about 2.5 times more central than other foreign suppliers. The latter finding
is driven by a high degree of regional integration along the manufacturing supply chain
developed across the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican borders (e.g., in the automotive industry),
making all producers most sensitive to upstream shocks. In fact, the latter is the highest
premium on technological centrality that we can recover in Table 7.
5 The role of the Input Rank in vertical integration
The decision to make or buy an input is the typical situation when a producer needs gathering
information on the technological relevance of both direct and indirect inputs. In this Section,
we test whether the Input Rank is a good predictor of vertical integration choices. The
intuition is that vertical integration possibly allows mitigating the frictions from upstream
markets. More in general, we expect that a parent company can internalize part of the shocks
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coming from (direct or indirect) suppliers. In this case, technologically central inputs in the
sense we discussed in Section 3 would be given priority in vertical integration choices. Our
empirical exercise takes on the firm-level framework by Alfaro et al. (2019) and Del Prete
and Rungi (2017), while augmenting equations with the Input Rank.
We will make use of a sample of U.S. parent companies that have integrated at least one
production stage over time up to 2015. Ownership data and firms’ accounts are sourced from
the Orbis database, compiled by the Bureau van Dijk. For our scope, we collect information
on 20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 154,836 subsidiaries around the world10. In Ta-
ble 4, we provide descriptive statistics of the geographic coverage of the subsidiaries. Both
subsidiaries and parent companies can be active in any industry: manufacturing (28.86%),
services (69%), primary (0.29%), and extractive (1.85%). About 81% of subsidiaries inte-
grated by U.S. parents are domestic. Not surprisingly, U.S. parent companies are engaged
mainly in global supply networks across other OECD economies, where 96% of their sub-
sidiaries are located. The Member States of the European Union host the largest number
of foreign subsidiaries in our sample. Among them, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
the Netherlands attract a significant share of U.S. foreign subsidiaries active in services
industries. Not surprisingly, NAFTA members, i.e. Canada and Mexico, mainly host manu-
facturing of final and intermediate goods. However, a non-negligible share of subsidiaries is
present in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
To validate our sample, we compare with official data on ’Activities of U.S. Multinational
Enterprises’ BEA (2018), and against OECD (2018) statistics. In 2015, BEA (2018) reports
6,880 billion dollars of total sales by foreign affiliates and 12,628 billion dollars of total sales
by parent companies. The U.S. multinational enterprises present in our sample account for
94% and 92% of the BEA (2018) values, respectively. The number of foreign affiliates in
our sample corresponds to 88.6% on the total of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reported in OECD
(2018), although the latter source only reports the values for the year 2014.
10We follow international standards for the identification of corporate control structures (OECD, 2005;
UNCTAD, 2009, 2016), according to which the unit of observation is the control link between a parent
company and each of its subsidiary that is controlled after a concentration of voting rights (50% plus one
stake). Similar data on MNEs have been used in Del Prete and Rungi (2017), Alviarez et al. (2017) and
Cravino and Levchenko (2016)
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Table 8: Geographic coverage
Final goods Intermediate inputs Services industries All industries
Hosting country N. % N. % N. % N. %
United States 20,571 16.3 24,590 19.5 80.279 64.1 125,890 100.0
European Union 1,934 11.5 2,084 12.3 12,872 76.2 16.890 100.0
of which:
Germany 273 13.2 306 14.8 1,494 72.1 2,073 100.0
France 171 11.0 213 13.7 1,167 75.2 1,551 100.0
United Kingdom 563 11.4 624 12.7 3,734 75.9 4,921 100.0
Italy 136 19.4 139 19.8 427 60.8 702 100.0
Netherlands 158 6.8 171 7.3 2,005 85.9 2,334 100.0
Canada 980 30.4 923 28.6 1,325 41.1 3,228 100.0
Russia 18 11.7 30 19.5 106 68.8 154 100.0
Asia 251 15.0 312 18.7 1,109 66.3 1,672 100.0
of which:
Japan 87 11.5 76 10.1 592 78.4 755 100.0
China 92 12.1 66 8.7 605 79.3 763 100.0
India 122 15.7 149 19.1 508 65.2 779 100.0
Africa 67 14.2 93 19.7 313 66.2 473 100.0
Middle East 82 18.2 80 17.8 288 64.0 450 100.0
Other Americas 221 12.1 495 21.6 1,210 66.3 1,926 100.0
of which:
Argentina 24 8.1 70 23.6 203 68.4 297 100.0
Brazil 137 14.6 219 23.3 583 62.1 939 100.0
Mexico 98 23.3 154 36.6 169 40.1 421 100.0
Australia 123 14.2 157 18.1 586 67.7 866 100.0
Rest of the world 489 16.5 585 19.7 1,892 63.8 2,966 100.0
Total 24,834 16.0 29,403 19.0 100,599 65.0 154,836 100.0
Note: firm-level data for year 2015 are sourced from Orbis, by Bureau Van Dijk. A U.S. parent company
controls a subsidiary wherever in the world with a direct or indirect equity stake higher than 50%, as from
international standards. Classification by intermediate and final products is based on correspondence
tables with Broad Economic Categories (BEC) rev. 4, as provided by the UN Statistics Division.
For the scope of our analysis, we map industry affiliations of both parent companies and
subsidiaries from the NAICS rev. 2012 classification into the 2002 U.S. BEA I-O Input-
Output Tables. The match by industry affiliations allows us combining firm-level data with
sector-level metrics, including the Input Rank we computed as from Section 4, the Relative
Upstreamness segments sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019), and the direct requirement coef-
ficient originally retrieved from I-O tables. All three previous indicators are industry-pair
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specific, i.e., considering the industry of the parent company and the one of each subsidiary.
The underlying assumption is that the affiliation to the parent company indicates the buying
industry, and the affiliation of each subsidiary indicates the (direct or indirect) supplying
industry. In the absence of actual data on firm-to-firm transactions, such a mapping allows
us proxying buyer-supplier relationships. For more details, see Section 4. Finally, we comple-
ment our data with input-industry estimates of demand elasticity sourced from Broda and
Weinstein (2006). In Appendix Table C3, we report descriptive statistics of industry-level
variables after the matching with sample firms and baseline estimates.
5.1 Empirical strategy
Let h = 1, 2, . . . , N denote the set of inputs, as from the I-O tables, and let r = 1, 2, . . . , R
denote the set of parent companies, each active in an output industry, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. The
dependent variable, yr(k), takes on a value 1 when at least one subsidiary in the h-th input
market has been integrated by a parent r in industry k, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, for each
parent company, we have a vector yr(k) =
[
y1r(k), . . . , yNr(k)
]
made of 0s and 1s when an h-th
input has been integrated or not, respectively. At this point, we can consider the probability
that a generic parent chooses among a set of alternatives such that:
Pr
(
yr(k)|
N∑
h=1
yhr(k)
)
=
exp
[
yhr(k)xhr(k)β
]∑N
sr(k)∈Sr(k) exp
[
sr(k)xhr(k)β
] (11)
where the element shr(k) of a vector sr(k) is equal to 1 if an input has been integrated, and
zero otherwise. Thus, sr(k) indicates the combination of inputs that have been integrated by
the r-th parent company after considering all the possible combinations one could pick from
Sr(k). Therefore, we identify a vector of covariates for each input-output pair, xhr(k), which
includes: i) the Input Rank of the h-th input with respect to the k-th output estimated with a
dampening factor equal χ = 1, i.e., assuming each parent company perfectly knows the entire
production network; ii) a binary variable Complements relative to the k-th output market;
the Upstreamness sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019); iii) the bilateral direct requirement
coefficient sourced directly from I-O tables. As in Antra`s and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al.
(2019), the variable Complements is equal to 1 when the elasticity of substitution of the
output market is below the median (ρk > ρmed), and 0 otherwise. Errors are clustered
by input markets. Fixed effects are included at the parent level. Results from nested
specifications are reported in Tables 9.
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5.2 Results
The odds ratios for the Input Rank are always higher than one and significant, therefore
parent companies preferably integrate (direct or indirect) inputs that are more central in their
production network because a productivity shock in those upstream markets has the potential
to hit harder on their downstream production processes. The magnitudes of the odds ratios
are quite stable across baseline specifications, in a range between 1.25 and 1.41. They are
also quite stable after controlling for Upstreamness and direct requirement coefficients.
Interestingly, odds ratios lower than one on Upstreamness indicate that it is less likely
that a parent company integrates distant inputs in the production network, i.e., the more
upstream they are the less likely they are integrated. From this point of view, it is clear
enough that the Input Rank and the Upstreamness convey different information on positions
along GVCs. In general, the coefficients on direct requirements are not robust along different
specifications that separate parent companies producing final goods from the ones producing
intermediate inputs.
Table 9: Input Rank and vertical integration - Fixed-effects conditional logit
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
input is integrated = 1
Input Rank hk 1.413*** 1.348*** 1.276*** 1.245*** 1.354**
(.093) (.066) (.098) (.104) (.142)
Input Elasticity [ > med ] h .554*** .583* .523**
(.120) (.186) (.160)
Input Rankhk × Input Elasticity [ > med ] h 1.179* 1.200 1.135
(.108) (.148) (.162)
Upstreamness hk .510*** .540*** .567*** .512***
(.057) (.071) (.098) (.105)
Direct Requirementhk 1.047** 1.031*** 1.032 1.033
(.027) (.018) (.031) (.021)
N. obs. 7,805,667 7,805,667 1,131,406 586,782 531,002
N. Parent companies 20,489 20,489 4,069 2,110 1,910
Parent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Activity of parent companies All All All Final Intermediate
Pseudo R-squared (McFadden’s) .402 .415 .226 .174 .279
Log pseudo-likelihood -94,000.003 -92,012.326 -23,417.893 -13,147.021 -10,120.049
Note: Odds ratios after a parent-level fixed-effects conditional logit are reported in the form
Pr(yhr(k)=1)
Pr(yhr(k)=0)
.
Errors are clustered by I-O output industries. Variables are standardized at their mean and variance. *,
**, *** stand for p < .10, p < .05, and p < .01, respectively. The variable Input Elasticity [ > med ] h
is available only for traded inputs.
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Notably, we also find that parent companies less likely integrate suppliers from highly
elastic industries, i.e., from suppliers that produce inputs whose substitutes are easier to
find on the market. Please note that the main reason why the sample reduces from column
2 to column 3 is because input elasticities are available only for traded inputs, as they are
sourced from an exercise on U.S. international trade data (Broda and Weinstein, 2006).
Results are robust to controls for sample composition in Table 10, when we look only at
manufacturing inputs (columns 1 and 2) or manufacturing outputs (columns 3 and 4), as
well as when we look only at top 100 inputs with the highest direct requirement coefficients
(columns 5 and 6). Finally, main findings are not sensitive to changes in the functional form.
In Appendix Table C4, we test alternatively that simple probit, logit, and linear probability
models present similar correlations between vertical integration choices, the Input Rank, the
Upstreamness, and the input elasticity.
Table 10: Input Rank and vertical integration - Robustness to sample composition
Dependent variable: Manuf input Manuf input Manuf output Manuf output Top 100 Top 100
input is integrated = 1
Input Rankhk 1.357*** 1.306*** 1.369*** 1.315*** 1.391*** 1.275***
(.066) (.083) (.065) (.082) (.071) (.082)
Input Elasticity [ > med ] h .709* .577** .328***
(.067) (.126) (.109)
Input Rankhk × Input Elasticity [ > med ] h 1.145 1.158 1.324**
(.108) (.106) (.145)
Upstreamnesshk .496*** .532*** .553*** .762 .751 .812
(.070) (.075) (.072) (.143) (.134) (.178)
Direct Requirementhk 1.009 1.022 1.044** 1.028 1.062*** 1.034*
(.035) (.025) (.020) (.071) (.019) (.018)
N. obs. 935,648 893,464 1,396,382 1,103,884 254,201 154,824
N. Parent companies 2,175 2,134 4,166 3,970 256 240
Parent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared (McFadden’s) .239 .248 .197 .229 .267 .350
Log pseudo-likelihood -20,124.371 -19,339.866 -30,250.643 -22,800.165 -13,785.276 -8,522.782
Note: Odds ratios after a parent-level fixed effects conditional logit are reported in the form
Pr(yhr(k)=1)
Pr(inthr(k)=0)
.
Errors are clustered by I-O output industries. Variables are standardized at their mean and vari-
ance. *, **, *** stand for p < .10, p < .05, and p < .01, respectively. Please note, the variable
Input Elasticity [ > med ] h is available only for traded industries.
Please note, once again, that results reported in Tables 9, 10, and C4 cannot be inter-
preted in a structural way, because we do not provide for a full incentive structure of the
relations established between buyers and suppliers in a production network. For example, we
do not consider the contractual environment that can endogenously determine the positions
of suppliers and the decisions to keep them at arms’ length. Yet, our intention is to show
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that network dimensions in GVCs matter, and our correlations point to a significant role
for input centrality, in the sense we introduced in Section 3, once we consider the possible
impact of a productivity shock from the upstream market.
6 Conclusions
In this contribution, we introduced the Input Rank as a theoretically sound measure to catch
the relevance of both direct and indirect suppliers from the perspective of downstream buyers,
whose production process can rely on increasingly sophisticated supply networks in times of
a global fragmentation. In our framework, a supplier ranks higher for a downstream buyer if
a productivity shock has a higher impact on that buyer’s marginal costs after transmission
through the supply network. Besides a full account of the topology of a production network,
we allow for a rich heterogeneity concerning how much firms rely on intermediate inputs, as
well as on how strong competitive forces are within each sector. At each stage of production,
a lower intensity in the usage of intermediate inputs (i.e., a higher intensity in labor services)
can buffer the transmission of a shock from upstream markets. At the same time, a higher
markup (i.e., a lower competitive pressure) on an upstream market will make downstream
buyers more sensitive to input-specific productivity shocks.
When we bring our model to I-O tables, we discover how central services industries are
in production networks, as they connect across most manufacturing and services industries
in a modern economy. After we look at international I-O tables, we retrieve a pecking order
in the geography of sourcing. Most crucial inputs come from domestic producers, in the first
place, and from regionally integrated partners, in the second place.
Finally, we show that the Input Rank is a good predictor of vertical integration choices
on a sample of U.S. parent companies controlling subsidiaries on a global scale, possibly
because upstream shocks can be mitigated after vertical integration.
Further work is needed to address, among others, the endogenous relationship between
the organization of the global supply network and the contractual environment. However, in
general, we argue that the Input Rank enables to catch the recursive and complex nature of
real-world supply networks, which are too often represented as supposedly linear chains in
studies on the international organization of production. Ours is a first step that shows that
technological non-linearities blend with endogenous market forces to shape global production
networks, whose loops, kinks, and corners can magnify or dampen policies and shocks on
globally integrated markets.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1. Let N+k denote the set of inputs of firms in sector k. The cost function of firm i
is given by
c(y(k, i);w,p) = λ(k, i)y(k, i),
where λ(k, i) = wβk
∏
h∈N+k p
αkghk
h τ
αkghk
h .
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Proof of Lemma 1. The Langragian of the cost minimization problem of firm i from
sector k:
L = w`(k, i) +
M∑
h=1
phx(k, i, h)− λ(k, i)
[
ζk`(k, i)
βk
(
M∏
h=1
(τ−1h x(k, i, h))
ghk
)αk
− y(k, i)
]
From the first-order necessary conditions (also sufficient, given convexity), we can deliver the
following conditional demand functions:
x(k, i, h) = λ(k, i)αkghk
y(k, i)
ph
; `(k, i) = λ(k, i)βk
y(k, i)
w
. (A1)
Plugging (A1) into the expression for the cost of firm i, it directly follows that c(y(k, i), wp) =
λ(k, i)y(k, i). Hence λ(k, i) is the marginal cost of production of firm i.
Substituting (A1) into the production function we obtain:
y(k, i) =ζk
(
λ(k, i)βky(k, i)
w
)βk ∏
h∈N+k
(
τ−1h
λ(k, i)αkghky(k, i)
ph
)ghkαk
=ζkλ(k, i)y(k, i)
(
βk
w
)βk ∏
h∈N+k
(
ghkαk
τhph
)ghkαk
=λ(k, i)w−βk
∏
h∈N+k
(phτh)
−ghkαk y(k, i),
where for the last equality we used the fact that ζk = β
−βk
k
∏
h∈N+k (αkghk)
−αkghk .
Solving for λ(k, i), we get:
λ(k, i) = wβk
∏
h∈N+k
pαkghkh τ
−αkghk
h . (A2)
as desired.
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Lemma 2. The following relations between firm-level marginal cost λ(k, i) and sector-level
marginal cost λk, and firm level markup µ(k, i) and sector level markup µk hold:
λk = M
1
1−k
k λ(k, i),
µk = µ(k, i) =
k
k − 1
Proof of Lemma 2. Using results from the theory of monopolistic competition, the sector-
level price of good k, pk, and the sector-level output, yk, are given by:
pk =
(
Mk∑
i=1
p(k, i)1−k
) 1
1−k
,
yk =
(
Mk∑
i=1
y(k, i)
k−1
k
) k
k−1
.
(A3)
In the symmetric equilibrium, p(k, i) = p(k, j), and y(k, i) = y(k, j). Hence:
pk = M
1
1−k
k p(k, i),
yk = M
k
k−1
k y(k, i).
Thanks to the assumption on constant returns to scale, and using the expression for yk, we
can write the sector-level marginal cost of production as:
λk =
Mk∑
i=1
λ(k, i)
y(k, i)
yk
=
Mkλ(k, i)y(k, i)
M
k
k−1
k y(k, i)
= M
1
1−k
k λ(k, i)
Finally, from the firm pricing rule we have p(k, i) = µ(k, i)λ(k, i). Plugging the pricing
35
rule in the expression for pk from (A3) we get:
pk =
(
Mk∑
i=1
(µ(k, i)λ(k, i))1−k
) 1
1−k
=
[
Mkµ(k, i)
1−kλ(k, i)1−k
] 1
1−k = M
1
1−k
k µ(k, i)λ(k, i) = µ(k, i)λk
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3. The aggregate demand of sector k for deliveries of input h is given by:
x(k, h) =
αkghkpkyk
µkph
=
k − 1
k
αkghkpkyk
ph
. (A4)
Proof of Lemma 3. Symmetry implies that x(k, h) = Mkx(k, i, h). From (A1) and Lemma
2, we get:
x(k, h) =Mkλ(k, i)αkghk
y(k, i)
ph
= MkM
− 1
1−k
k
pk
µk
αkghkM
− k
k−1
k yk =
αkghkpkyk
µkph
where we used the fact that pk = M
1
1−k
k µ(k, i)λ(k, i) and that µk = µ(k, i) for i ∈ k.
Proof of Proposition 1. For notational simplicity, let xˇ denote log x for any variable x.
Taking logarithms of (A2) and using the pricing rule (ph = µhλh), we get:
λˇ(k, i) = βkwˇ + αk
∑
h∈N+K
ghk (µˇh + τˇh) + αk
∑
h∈N+k
ghkλˇh.
From Lemma 2, we can write the above equation in terms of sector level marginal cost as:
λˇk =
1
k − 1Mˇk + βkwˇ + αk
∑
h∈N+k
ghk (µˇh + τˇh) + αk
∑
h∈N+k
ghkλˇh
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Define column vector η = { 1
k−1Mˇk}Mk=1. Moreover normalize w = 1. Writing the above
equation for all k’s in vector notation we get:
λˇ =η + AG′µˇ+ AG′τ + AG′λ⇒
λˇ = [I−AG′]−1 (η + AG′(µˇ+ τˇ )).
(A5)
Finally, by differentiating we get:
∂λˇ(k, i)
∂τˇh
=
∂λˇk
∂τˇh
= e′k [I−AG′]−1 AG′eh = e′k
[
[I−AG′]−1 − I
]
eh
=e′h
[
[I−GA]−1 − I] ek.
Whenever k 6= h the above equation has a form:
∂λˇ(k, i)
∂τˇh
= e′h [I−GA]−1 ek,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. From (A5) we have:
λˇk =
M∑
`=1
υ`kη` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kµˇ` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kτˇ` − µˇk − τˇk,
where υ`k is the Input Rank of input ` for firms in k. Using Lemma 2 we get:
λˇ(k, i) =
M∑
`=1
υ`kη` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kµˇ` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kτˇ` − µˇk − τˇk − ηk,
which gives:
λ(k, i) = exp
(
M∑
`=1
υ`kη` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kµˇ` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kτˇ` − µˇk − τˇk − ηk
)
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where exp denotes the exponential function. Define:
δk ≡
M∑
`=1
υ`kη` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kµˇ` +
M∑
`=1
υ`kτˇ` − µˇk − τˇk − ηk.
By simple differentiation of λ(k, i) we get:
∂λ(k, i)
∂τh
=
υhk
τh
eδk ,
from where if follows directly that ∂
2λ(k,i)
∂τh∂υhk
> 0.
To calculate ∂
2λ(k,i)
∂τh∂h
we recall that µh =
h
h−1 and ηk =
1
k−1Mˇk, an thus:
∂2λ(k, i)
∂τh∂h
=
υ2hk
τh
eδk
(
∂ηh
∂h
+
∂µˇh
∂h
)
=
υ2hk
τh
eδk
1− h(1 + Mˇh)
(h − 1)2h < 0,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that Mh ≥ 1 and h > 1, which completes the
proof.
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Appendix B:
Imperfect information on the supply network
In this Appendix, we consider the case of a producer that does not fully observe her
supply network. Intuitively, a firm cannot outreach the entire web of specialized suppliers
when production networks are more sophisticated. To fix ideas, it is worth looking back at
the fictional supply network reported in Figure 3. Any time the manager of a firm 1 tries
to collect information about upstream transactions, say about transactions between firm 3
and its suppliers, she has a limited ability to know the quality and quantity of deliveries.
She can call the direct supplier to ask or, alternatively, she can gather information on the
market when, for example, prices and qualities of upstream inputs are relatively standard
terms to include in a contract. At any upstream step, e.g. from firm 4 up to firm 6, the
same problem starts all over again.
We capture this phenomena in a stylized way by assuming that firm i in a sector k does
not observe the full network G but rather its subnetwork χkG, where one can think of χk as
a parameter capturing the share of transactions in the production network observed by firms
form sector k. We assume that the extent to which the network is observed (χk) is output-
specific, i.e., it varies according to the peculiar contractual environment of the downstream
market. In this, we follow the seminal intuition by Rauch (1999), who sketched the idea of
a network search on international trade when products are differentiated or homogeneous.
In line with that intuition, we can think of χk as a search barrier in supply networks. Even
more realistically, one may consider an extension to the case when firms in sector k observe
suppliers of firms in sector h with independent probabilities χhk. Then, we would replace a
scalar χk with a diagonal matrix Hk that has diagonal elements equal to χhk. Taking the
output as a reference, we align with Nunn (2007), who looks at an average measure of input
contract intensity to infer the ’thickness’ and the relation-specificity of the markets.
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Hence, when assessing the importance of suppliers from sector h, instead of relying on In-
put Rank νhk(GA) = e
′
h(I−GA)ek, firms from sector k consider Input Rank νhk(χkGA) =
e′h(I− χkGA)−1ek. Since χk ≤ 1, firm i ∈ k underestimates the importance of indirect
suppliers. When χk is smaller, suppliers that are relatively closer to the final producer will
have a relatively higher Input Rank than more distant suppliers. To illustrate this property,
we calculate the Input Rank using the network from Figure 3 at changing values of the
dampening rates χ (assumed to be equal for each node k) and plot it in Figure B1.
Figure B1: Input Rank as a function the searching parameter χ
Note: Input Ranks for the output of firm 1 calculated for a fictional supply network depicted in Figure
3, assuming symmetric input deliveries and labor intensities, as functions of χ.
When plotting Figure B1, we assume that for any fixed output node k and any two
of its suppliers h1 and h2, we have gh1k = gh2k. Interestingly, although there are more
(upstream) paths connecting firm 1 to firm 6 than firm 1 to firm 2, firm 2 will have a
disproportionately higher Input Rank when the dampening rate becomes smaller and smaller.
In a nutshell, a limited ability to outreach on the input markets implies that downstream
buyers underestimate the role of longer paths in production network. In other words, search
barriers can prevent the downstream buyers to explore production processes that are too
distant in the supply structure.
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Appendix C: Tables and Graphs
Figure C1: In-degree distribution of Input-Output Network from U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables
Note: Number of input industries by output ordered on the x-axis. Average: 122. Minimum at the
Logging industry (code 113300) is 45. Maximum at the Retail Trade (code 4A0000) is 296.
Figure C2: Out-degree distribution of Input-Output Network from U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables
Note: Number of buying industries by output ordered on the x-axis. Average: 122. Minimum at the
Museums, Historical Sites, Zoos, and Parks (code 712000) is 0. Maximum at the Wholesale Trade (code
420000) is 425.
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Table C1: Top 10 inputs of the Automobile Manufacturing (I-O code: 336111)
Abs. Rank I-O code Industry name Input Rank
1 336111 Automobile Manufacturing .10263
2 336300 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing .05608
3 420000 Wholesale Trade .01183
4 550000 Management of Companies and Enterprises .01103
5 531000 Real Estate .00965
6 331110 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing .00834
7 211000 Oil and Gas Extraction .00721
8 533000 Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets .00521
9 221100 Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution .00492
10 324110 Petroleum Refineries .00492
Note: The full Input Rank vector of the Automobile Manufacturing (code 336111) has been computed
starting from all 421 industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables.
Table C2: Top 10 inputs of the Electronic Computer Manufacturing (I-O code: 334111)
Abs. Rank I-O code Industry name Input Rank
1 334111 Electronic Computer Manufacturing .09650
2 334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing .01882
3 334418 Printed Circuit Assembly Manufacturing .01472
4 420000 Wholesale Trade .01354
5 334413 Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing .01318
6 550000 Management of Companies and Enterprises .01220
7 531000 Real Estate .00981
8 511200 Software Publishers .00675
9 33411A Computer Terminals and Other Computer Peripheral Equipment .00626
10 541800 Advertising and Related Services .00459
Note: The full Input Rank vector of the Automobile Manufacturing (code 336111) has been computed
starting from all 421 industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables.
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Table C3: Descriptive statistics of industry-level variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max N. obs.
Input Rank .0021 .0183 .0001 .5530 1,131,406
Upstreamness 3.2752 .8865 1.0029 8.7470 1,131,406
Direct requirement coeff. .0009 .0073 0 .4194 1,131,406
Elasticity of substitution 8.7239 11.8644 1.3 108.5019 1,131,406
Note: Input Rank, Upstreamness, and direct requirement coefficients are based on U.S. I-O 2002 Tables
sourced from BEA (2002). Elasticities of substitution for inputs are sourced from Broda and Weinstein
(2006). Number of sample observations refer to the last columnn of baseline estimates in Table 9.
Table C4: Input Rank and vertical integration - Different functional forms
Dependent variable: LPM LPM Logit Logit Probit Probit
input is integrated = 1
Input Rankhk .027*** .023*** 1.324*** 1.266*** .140*** .127***
(.006) (.008) (.065) (.090) (.035) (.029)
Input Elasticity [ > med ] h -.002* .564*** -.209***
(.001) (.120) (.072)
Input Rankhk × Input Elasticity [ > med ] h .015 1.161* .072*
(.011) (.095) (.038)
Upstreamnesshk -.001** -.001** .545*** .521*** -.228*** -215***
(.001) (.001) (.052) (.065) (.033) (.040)
Direct Requirementhk .001 -.001 1.049*** 1.036** .027*** .016**
(.001) (.001) (.017) (.016) (.008) (.008)
Constant .006*** .006*** .003*** .004*** -2.738*** -2.669***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.038) (.050)
N. obs. 7,805,667 1,257,911 7,805,667 1,257,911 7,805,667 1,257,911
N. Parent companies 20,467 3,510 20,467 3,510 20,467 3,510
Parent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared .084 .096 - - - -
Pseudo R-squared (McFadden’s) - - .150 .181 .160 .191
Log pseudo-likelihood - - -40,445.334 -30,347.22 -39,945.341 -29,985.011
Note: Odds ratios are reported when we run a logit model, in the form
Pr(yhr(k)=1)
Pr(yhr(k)=0)
. Marginal ef-
fects and beta coefficients are reported for probit specifications and linear probability models, respec-
tively. Errors are clustered by I-O output industries. Variables are standardized at their mean and
variance. *, **, *** stand for p < .10, p < .05, and p < .01, respectively. Please note, the variable
Input Elasticity [ > med ] h is available only for traded industries.
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